Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types
T-Space at The University of Toronto Libraries
View Archive Info| Field | Value | |
| Creator |
Yeon-Koo, Che; Columbia University and University of Wisconsin--Madison
Ian, Gale; Georgetown University |
|
| Date |
2006-03-14T14:38:52Z
2006-03-14T14:38:52Z 2006-03-02 |
|
| Identifier |
http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/20060095
Theoretical Economics; Vol 1, No 1 (2006), pages 95-118 http://hdl.handle.net/1807/4778 |
|
| Description |
[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] This paper develops a methodology for characterizing expected revenue from auctions when bidders' types come from an arbitrary distribution. In particular, types may be multidimensional, and there may be mass points in the distribution. One application extends existing revenue equivalence results. Another application shows that first-price auctions yield higher expected revenue than second-price auctions when bidders are risk averse and face financial constraints. This revenue ranking extends to risk-averse bidders with general forms of non-expected utility prefererences.
|
|
| Format |
309113 bytes
308333 bytes 1726 bytes application/pdf application/pdf text/plain |
|
| Language |
en
en_US |
|
| Publisher |
Theoretical Economics
|
|
| Rights |
Authors who publish in Theoretical Economics will release their articles under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial license. This license allows anyone to copy and distribute the article for non-commercial purposes provided that appropriate attribution is given.
|
|
| Subject |
Auctions, multidimensional types and atoms, risk aversion, Gateaux differentiable preferences
C70, D44 |
|
| Title |
Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types
|
|
| Type |
Peer-reviewed Article
|
|